The current study examines the relationships between CEO job characteristics, ownership, and performance-based compensation, and firm-level investment efficiency, comparing the mediating role of information asymmetry and the moderating role of board governance. Set within an Agency/Stewardship framework, a moderated mediation is modelled utilizing panel data from 293 non-financial firms sourced from the Pakistan Stock Exchange (2014-2023). Investment efficiency is measured by external indicators of firm-specific crash risk (NCSKEW). We find that CEO incentives have a significant influence on investment efficiency, both directly and indirectly through information asymmetry. In addition, the quality of board governance moderates both the CEO-asymmetry relationship as well as the asymmetry-efficiency relationship. Overall, these findings show that CEO incentives can serve both stewardship governance roles and act as amplifying sources of risk in situations of weak governance. This study contributes to the extant literature by conceptualizing and integrating various internal executive attributes, governance attributes, and informational environments to explain firm investment behavior, particularly in the context of emerging markets, such as Pakistan.